Abstract-In this paper, we consider the Gaussian multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) multi-receiver wiretap channel in which a transmitter wants to have confidential communication with an arbitrary number of users in the presence of an external eavesdropper. We derive the secrecy capacity region of this channel for the most general case. We first show that even for the single-input single-output (SISO) case, existing converse techniques for the Gaussian scalar broadcast channel cannot be extended to this secrecy context, to emphasize the need for a new proof technique. Our new proof technique makes use of the relationships between the minimum-mean-square-error and the mutual information, and equivalently, the relationships between the Fisher information and the differential entropy. Using the intuition gained from the converse proof of the SISO channel, we first prove the secrecy capacity region of the degraded MIMO channel, in which all receivers have the same number of antennas, and the noise covariance matrices can be arranged according to a positive semi-definite order. We then generalize this result to the aligned case, in which all receivers have the same number of antennas; however, there is no order among the noise covariance matrices. We accomplish this task by using the channel enhancement technique. Finally, we find the secrecy capacity region of the general MIMO channel by using some limiting arguments on the secrecy capacity region of the aligned MIMO channel. We show that the capacity achieving coding scheme is a variant of dirty-paper coding with Gaussian signals.
I. INTRODUCTION

I
NFORMATION theoretic secrecy was initiated by Wyner in his seminal work [1] . Wyner considered a degraded wiretap channel, where the eavesdropper gets a degraded version of the legitimate receiver's observation. For this degraded model, he found the capacity-equivocation rate region where the equivocation rate refers to the portion of the message rate that can be delivered to the legitimate receiver, while the eavesdropper is kept totally ignorant of this part. Later, Csiszar and Korner considered the general wiretap channel, where there is no presumed degradation order between the legitimate user and the eavesdropper [2] . They found the capacity-equivocation rate region of this general, not necessarily degraded, wiretap channel.
In recent years, information theoretic secrecy has gathered a renewed interest, where most of the attention has been devoted to the multi-user extensions of the wiretap channel, see for example [3] - [21] . One natural extension of the wiretap channel to the multi-user setting is the problem of secure broadcasting. In this case, there is one transmitter which wants to communicate with several legitimate users in the presence of an external eavesdropper. Hereafter, we call this channel model the multi-receiver wiretap channel. Finding the secrecy capacity region for the most general form of this channel model seems to be quite challenging, especially if one remembers that, even without the eavesdropper, we do not know the capacity region for the underlying channel, which is a general broadcast channel with an arbitrary number of users. However, we know the capacity region for some special classes of broadcast channels, which suggests that we might be able to find the secrecy capacity region for some special classes of multi-receiver wiretap channels. This suggestion has been taken into consideration in [8] - [11] . In particular, in [9] - [11] , the degraded multi-receiver wiretap channel is considered, where there is a certain degradation order among the legitimate users and the eavesdropper. The corresponding secrecy capacity region is derived for the two-user case in [9] , and for an arbitrary number of users in [10] , [11] . The importance of this class lies in the fact that the Gaussian scalar multi-receiver wiretap channel belongs to this class.
In this work, we start with the Gaussian scalar multi-receiver wiretap channel, and find its secrecy capacity region. Although, in the later parts of the paper, we provide the secrecy capacity region of the Gaussian multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) multi-receiver wiretap channel which subsumes the scalar case, there are two reasons for the presentation of the scalar case separately. The first one is to show that, existing converse techniques for the Gaussian scalar broadcast channel, i.e., the converse proofs of Bergmans [22] and El Gamal [23] , cannot be extended in a straightforward manner to provide a converse proof for the Gaussian scalar multi-receiver wiretap channel. We explicitly show that the main ingredient of these two converses in [22] , [23] , which is the entropy-power inequality [24] - [26] , 1 is insufficient to conclude a converse for the secrecy capacity region. The second reason for the separate presentation is to present the main ingredients of the technique that we will use to provide a converse proof for the general MIMO channel in an isolated manner in a simpler context. We provide two converse proofs for the Gaussian scalar multi-receiver wiretap channel. The first one uses the connection between the minimum-mean-square-error (MMSE) and the mutual information along with the properties of the MMSE [29] , [30] . In additive Gaussian channels, the Fisher information, another important quantity in estimation theory, and the MMSE have a one-to-one relationship in the sense that one of them determines the other one, and vice versa [31] . Thus, the converse proof relying on the MMSE has a counterpart which replaces the Fisher information with the MMSE in the corresponding converse proof. Hence, the second converse uses the connection between the Fisher information and the differential entropy via the De Bruijn identity [24] - [26] along with the properties of the Fisher information. This reveals that the Fisher information matrix or equivalently the MMSE matrix should play an important role in the converse proof of the MIMO case.
Keeping this motivation in mind, we consider the Gaussian MIMO multi-receiver wiretap channel next. Instead of directly tackling the most general case in which each receiver has an arbitrary number of antennas and an arbitrary noise covariance matrix, we first consider two sub-classes of MIMO channels. In the first sub-class, all receivers have the same number of antennas and the noise covariance matrices exhibit a positive semi-definite order, which implies the degradedness of these channels. Hereafter, we call this channel model the degraded Gaussian MIMO multi-receiver wiretap channel. In the second sub-class, although all receivers still have the same number of antennas as in the degraded case, the noise covariance matrices do not have to satisfy any positive semi-definite order. Hereafter, we call this channel model the aligned Gaussian MIMO multi-receiver wiretap channel. Our approach will be to first find the secrecy capacity region of the degraded case, then to generalize this result to the aligned case by using the channel enhancement technique [32] . Once we obtain the secrecy capacity region of the aligned case, we use this result to find the secrecy capacity region of the most general case by some limiting arguments as in [32] , [33] . Thus, the main contribution and the novelty of our work is the way we prove the secrecy capacity region of the degraded Gaussian MIMO multi-receiver wiretap channel, since the remaining steps from then on are mainly adaptations of the existing proof techniques [32] , [33] to an eavesdropper and/or multi-user setting.
At this point, to clarify our contributions, it might be useful to note the similarity of the proof steps that we follow with those in [32] , where the capacity region of the Gaussian MIMO broadcast channel was established. In [32] also, the authors considered the degraded, the aligned and the general cases successively. Although, both [32] and this paper has these same proof steps, there are differences between how and why these steps are taken. In [32] , the main difficulty in obtaining the capacity region of the Gaussian MIMO broadcast channel was to extend Bergmans' converse for the scalar case to the degraded vector channel. This difficulty was overcome in [32] by the invention of the channel enhancement technique. However, as discussed earlier, Bergmans' converse cannot be extended to our secrecy context, even for the degraded scalar case. Thus, we need a new technique which we construct by using the Fisher information matrix and the generalized De Bruijn identity [34] . After we obtain the secrecy capacity region of the degraded MIMO channel, we adapt the channel enhancement technique to our setting to find the secrecy capacity region of the aligned MIMO channel. The difference of the way channel enhancement is used here as compared to the one in [32] comes from the presence of an eavesdropper, and its difference from the one in [33] is due to the presence of many legitimate users. After we find the secrecy capacity region of the aligned MIMO channel, we use the limiting arguments that appeared in [32] , [33] to prove the secrecy capacity region of the general MIMO channel.
The single user version of the Gaussian MIMO multi-receiver wiretap channel we study here, i.e., the Gaussian MIMO wiretap channel, was solved by [35] , [36] for the general case and by [37] for the 2-2-1 case. Their common proof technique was to derive a Sato-type outer bound on the secrecy capacity, and then to tighten this outer bound by searching over all possible correlation structures among the noise vectors of the legitimate user and the eavesdropper. Later, [33] gave an alternative, simpler proof by using the channel enhancement technique.
II. MULTI-RECEIVER WIRETAP CHANNELS
In this section, we first revisit the multi-receiver wiretap channel. The general multi-receiver wiretap channel consists of one transmitter with an input alphabet legitimate receivers with output alphabets , and an eavesdropper with output alphabet . The transmitter sends a confidential message to each user, say to the th user, and all messages are to be kept secret from the eavesdropper. The channel is memoryless with a transition probability . A code for this channel consists of message sets, , an encoder decoders, one at each legitimate receiver, . The probability of error is defined as , where is a uniformly distributed random variable in . A rate tuple is said to be achievable if there exists a code with and
where denotes any subset of . Hence, we consider only perfect secrecy rates. We also note that since we are interested in the perfect secrecy case, it is sufficient to consider the constraint (2) because (2) implies (1) [11] . The secrecy capacity region is defined as the closure of all achievable rate tuples.
The degraded multi-receiver wiretap channel exhibits the following Markov chain: (3) whose capacity region was established in [10] , [11] for an arbitrary number of users and in [9] for two users.
Theorem 1 ([11, Theorem 1]):
The secrecy capacity region of the degraded multi-receiver wiretap channel is given by the union of the rate tuples satisfying 2 (4) where , and the union is over all probability distributions of the form (5) We remark here that since the channel is degraded, i.e., we have the Markov chain in (3), the capacity expressions in (4) are equivalent to (6) We will use this equivalent expression frequently hereafter. For the case of two users and one eavesdropper, i.e., , the expressions in (6) reduce to (7) (8) Finding the secrecy capacity region of the two-user degraded multi-receiver wiretap channel is tantamount to finding the optimal joint distributions of that trace the boundary of the secrecy capacity region given in (7)- (8) . For the -user degraded multi-receiver wiretap channel, we need to find the optimal joint distributions of in the form given in (5) that trace the boundary of the region expressed in (4).
III. GAUSSIAN MIMO MULTI-RECEIVER WIRETAP CHANNEL
A. Degraded Gaussian MIMO Multi-Receiver Wiretap Channel
In this paper, we first consider the degraded Gaussian MIMO multi-receiver wiretap channel which is defined through (9) (10) where the channel input is subject to a covariance constraint (11) where , and are zero-mean Gaussian random vectors with covariance matrices which satisfy the following ordering: (12) In a multi-receiver wiretap channel, since the capacity-equivocation rate region depends only on the conditional marginal distributions of the transmitter-receiver links, but not on the entire joint distribution of the channel, the correlations among have no consequence on the capacity-equivocation rate region. Thus, without changing the corresponding secrecy capacity region, we can adjust the correlation structure among these noise vectors to ensure that they satisfy the following Markov chain: (13) which is always possible because of our assumption regarding the covariance matrices in (12) . Moreover, the Markov chain in (13) implies that any Gaussian MIMO multi-receiver wiretap channel satisfying the semi-definite ordering in (12) can be treated as a degraded multi-receiver wiretap channel; hence, Theorem 1 gives its capacity region. Hereafter, we will assume that the degraded Gaussian MIMO wiretap channel satisfies the Markov chain in (13) .
In Section V, we obtain the secrecy capacity region of the degraded Gaussian MIMO multi-receiver wiretap channel, which is stated in the following theorem.
Theorem 2:
The secrecy capacity region of the degraded Gaussian MIMO multi-receiver wiretap channel is given by the union of the rate tuples satisfying (14) where the union is over all positive semi-definite matrices that satisfy (15) We prove Theorem 2 by showing that jointly Gaussian are sufficient to evaluate the region given in Theorem 1 for the degraded Gaussian MIMO multi-receiver wiretap channel. The details of the proof of Theorem 2 are deferred to Section V. We acknowledge an independent and concurrent work in [28] , where the secrecy capacity region of the degraded Gaussian MIMO multi-receiver wiretap channel is found for . Their proof is different than ours in the sense that it first provides a vector generalization of Costa's entropy-power inequality [27] , and next uses this generalized inequality to establish the secrecy capacity region of the two-user degraded Gaussian MIMO multi-receiver wiretap channel.
B. Aligned Gaussian MIMO Multi-Receiver Wiretap Channel
Next, we consider the aligned Gaussian MIMO multi-receiver wiretap channel which is again defined by (9)- (10) , and the input is again subject to a covariance constraint as in (11) with . However, for the aligned Gaussian MIMO multi-receiver wiretap channel, noise covariance matrices do not have any semi-definite ordering, as opposed to the degraded case which exhibits the ordering in (12) . For the aligned Gaussian MIMO multi-receiver wiretap channel, the only assumption on the noise covariance matrices is that they are strictly positivedefinite, i.e., and . Since this channel does not have any ordering among the noise covariance matrices, it cannot be considered as a degraded channel; thus, there is no single-letter formula for its secrecy capacity region. Moreover, we do not expect superposition coding with stochastic encoding to be optimal, as it was optimal for the degraded channel. Indeed, we will show that dirty-paper coding with stochastic encoding is optimal in this case.
In Section VI, we obtain the secrecy capacity region of the aligned Gaussian MIMO multi-receiver wiretap channel, which will be stated next. To this end, we introduce some notation which is necessary to express the secrecy capacity region of the aligned Gaussian MIMO multi-receiver wiretap channel. Given the covariance matrices such that , let us define the following rates: (16) where and is a one-to-one permutation on . We also note that the subscript of does not denote the th user, instead it denotes the th user in line to be encoded. Rather, the secrecy rate of the th user is given by (17) when dirty-paper coding with stochastic encoding is used with an encoding order of . We define the region as given by (18) , shown at the bottom of the page.
The secrecy capacity region of the aligned Gaussian MIMO broadcast channel is given by the following theorem.
Theorem 3:
The secrecy capacity region of the aligned Gaussian MIMO multi-receiver wiretap channel is given by the convex closure of the following union: (19) where is the set of all possible one-to-one permutations on . We show the achievability of the region in Theorem 3 by using dirty-paper coding with stochastic encoding. We provide the converse proof of Theorem 3 by using our capacity result for the degraded Gaussian MIMO multi-receiver wiretap channel given in Theorem 2 in conjunction with the channel enhancement technique [32] . The details of the proof of Theorem 3 are deferred to Section VI.
C. General Gaussian MIMO Multi-Receiver Wiretap Channel
Finally, we consider the most general form of the Gaussian MIMO multi-receiver wiretap channel which is given by (20) (21) where the channel input , which is a column vector, is again subject to a covariance constraint as in (11) with . The channel output for the th user is denoted by which is a column vector of size . The eavesdropper's observation is of size . The covariance matrices of the Gaussian random vectors are denoted by 3 , which are assumed to be strictly positive definite. The channel gain matrices are of sizes , respectively, and they are known to the transmitter, all legitimate users and the eavesdropper.
Similar to the aligned Gaussian MIMO multi-receiver wiretap channel, we obtain the secrecy capacity region of the general Gaussian MIMO multi-receiver wiretap channel by showing the optimality of the dirty-paper coding with stochastic encoding. Next, we state the secrecy capacity region of the general Gaussian MIMO multi-receiver wiretap channel. To this end, we introduce some notation which is necessary to express the secrecy capacity region of the general Gaussian MIMO multi-receiver wiretap channel. Given the covariance matrices such that , we define the following rates: (22) where and is a one-to-one permutation on . We also note that the subscript of does not denote the th user, instead it denotes the th user in line to be encoded. Rather, the secrecy rate of the th user is given by (23) when dirty-paper coding with stochastic encoding is used with an encoding order of . We define the region as given by (24) , shown at the bottom of the page.
The secrecy capacity region of the general Gaussian MIMO broadcast channel is given by the following theorem.
Theorem 4:
The secrecy capacity region of the general Gaussian MIMO multi-receiver wiretap channel is given by the convex closure of the following union: (25) where is the set of all possible one-to-one permutations on . We prove Theorem 4 by using some limiting arguments in conjunction with our capacity result for the aligned Gaussian MIMO multi-receiver wiretap channel given in Theorem 3. The details of the proof of Theorem 4 are deferred to Section VII.
D. A Comment on the Covariance Constraint
In the literature, it is more common to define capacity regions under a total power constraint, i.e., , instead of the covariance constraint that we imposed, i.e.,
. However, as shown in [32] , once the capacity region is obtained under a covariance constraint, then the capacity region under more lenient constraints on the channel inputs can be obtained, if these constraints can be expressed as compact sets defined over the input covariance matrices. For example, the total power constraint and the per-antenna power constraint can be described by compact sets of input covariance matrices as follows: (26) (27) respectively, where is the th diagonal entry of , and denotes the number of transmit antennas. Thus, if the secrecy capacity region under a covariance constraint is found and denoted by , then the secrecy capacity regions under the total power constraint and the per-antenna power constraint can be expressed as
respectively. One other comment about the covariance constraint on the channel input is regarding the positive definiteness of . Following Lemma 2 of [32] , it can be shown that, for any degraded (resp. aligned) Gaussian MIMO multi-receiver channel under a covariance constraint where is a noninvertible positive semi-definite matrix, i.e., and , we can find another equivalent degraded (resp. aligned) channel with fewer transmit and receive antennas under a covariance constraint such that . Here the equivalence refers to the fact that both of these channels will have the same secrecy capacity region. Thus, as long as a degraded or an aligned channel is considered, there is no loss of generality in imposing a covariance constraint with a strictly positive definite matrix , and this is why we assumed that is strictly positive definite for the degraded and the aligned channels.
IV. GAUSSIAN SISO MULTI-RECEIVER WIRETAP CHANNEL
We first visit the Gaussian SISO multi-receiver wiretap channel. The aims of this section are to show that a straightforward extension of existing converse techniques for the Gaussian scalar broadcast channel fails to provide a converse proof for the Gaussian SISO multi-receiver wiretap channel, and to provide an alternative proof technique using either the MMSE or the Fisher information along with their connections with the differential entropy. To this end, we first define the Gaussian SISO multi-receiver wiretap channel (30) ( 31) where we also restrict our attention to the two-user case for simplicity of the presentation. The channel input is subject to a power constraint . The variances of the zero-mean Gaussian random variables are given by , respectively, and satisfy the following order:
Since the correlations among have no effect on the secrecy capacity region, we can adjust the correlation structure to ensure the following Markov chain:
Thus, this channel can be considered as a degraded channel, and its secrecy capacity region is given by Theorem 1, in particular, by (7) and (8) . Hence, to compute the secrecy capacity region explicitly, we need to find the optimal joint distributions of in (7) and (8) . The corresponding secrecy capacity region is given by the following theorem.
Theorem 5:
The secrecy capacity region of the two-user Gaussian SISO wiretap channel is given by the union of the rate pairs satisfying
where the union is over all , and denotes . The achievability of this region can be shown by selecting to be jointly Gaussian in Theorem 1. We focus on the converse proof.
A. Revisiting Converse Proofs for the Gaussian Scalar Broadcast Channel
As a natural approach, one might try to adopt the converse proofs of the scalar Gaussian broadcast channel for the converse proof of Theorem 5. In the literature, there are two converses for the Gaussian scalar broadcast channel which share some main principles. The first converse was given by Bergmans [22] who used Fano's lemma in conjunction with the entropy-power inequality [24] - [26] to find the capacity region. Later, El Gamal gave a relatively simple proof [23] which does not recourse to Fano's lemma. Rather, he started from the single-letter expression for the capacity region and used entropy-power inequality [24] - [26] to evaluate this region. Thus, the entropy-power inequality [24] - [26] is the main ingredient of these converses. 4 We now attempt to extend these converses to our secrecy context, i.e., to provide the converse proof of Theorem 5, and show where the argument breaks. In particular, what we will show in the following discussion is that a stand-alone use of the entropy-power inequality [24] - [26] falls short of proving the optimality of Gaussian signalling in this secrecy context, as opposed to the Gaussian scalar broadcast channel. For that purpose, we consider El Gamal's converse for the Gaussian scalar broadcast channel. However, since the entropy-power inequality is in a central role for both El Gamal's and Bergmans' converse, the upcoming discussion can be carried out by using Bergmans' proof as well.
First, we consider the bound on the second user's secrecy rate. Using (8), we have (36) where the right-hand side is obtained by using the chain rule, and the Markov chain . The expression in the first bracket is maximized by Gaussian [38] yielding (37) Moreover, using the Markov chain , we can bound the expression in the second bracket as (38) (39) (40) which implies that for any pair, there exists an such that (41) Combining (37) and (41) in (36) yields the desired bound on given in (35) .
From now on, we focus on obtaining the bound given in (34) on the first user's secrecy rate. To this end, one needs to solve the following optimization problem 5 (42) (43) When the term is absent in both the objective function and the constraint, as in the case of the Gaussian scalar broadcast channel, the entropy-power inequality [24] - [26] can be used to solve this optimization problem. However, the presence of this term complicates the situation, and a stand-alone use of the entropy-power inequality [24] - [26] does not seem to 5 Equivalently, one can consider the following optimization problem: 
where the inequality is obtained by using the entropy-power inequality [24] - [26] . Since the right-hand side of (45) is monotonically increasing in , to show the optimality of Gaussian signalling, we need (46) which will result in the desired bound on (42), i.e., the desired end-result in (34) .
We now check whether (46) holds under the constraint given in (43) . To this end, consider the difference of mutual informations in (43) (47) (48) where the inequality is obtained by using the entropy-power inequality [24] - [26] . Now, using the constraint given in (43) Thus, as opposed to the inequality that we need to show the optimality of Gaussian signalling via the entropy-power inequality [24] - [26] , i.e., the bound in (46), we have an opposite inequality. This discussion reveals that if Gaussian signalling is optimal, then its proof cannot be deduced from a straightforward extension of the converse proofs for the Gaussian scalar broadcast channel in [22] , [23] . Thus, we need a new technique to provide the converse for Theorem 5. We now present two different proofs. The first proof relies on the relationship between the MMSE and the mutual information along with the properties of the MMSE, and the second proof replaces the MMSE with the Fisher information.
B. Converse for Theorem 5 Using the MMSE
We now provide a converse which uses the connection between the MMSE and the mutual information established in [29] , [30] . In [30] , the authors also give an alternative converse for the scalar Gaussian broadcast channel. Our proof will follow this converse, and generalize it to the context where there are secrecy constraints.
First, we briefly state the necessary background information. Let be a zero-mean unit-variance Gaussian random variable, and be a pair of arbitrarily correlated random variables which are independent of . The MMSE of when it is observed through and is (51) As shown in [29] , [30] , the MMSE and the conditional mutual information are related through (52)
For our converse, we need the following proposition which was proved in [30] .
Proposition 1 ([30, Proposition 12]):
Let be as specified above. The function (53) has at most one zero in unless is Gaussian conditioned on with variance , in which case the function is identically zero on . In particular, if is the unique zero, then is strictly increasing on , and strictly positive on . We now give the converse. We use exactly the same steps from (36) to (41) to establish the bound on the secrecy rate of the second user given in (35) . To bound the secrecy rate of the first user, we first restate (41) (66) where (64) follows from (56) and (57), and (65) is due to (60). Since (66) is the desired bound on the secrecy rate of the first user given in (34) , this completes the converse proof.
C. Converse for Theorem 5 Using the Fisher Information
We now provide an alternative converse which replaces the MMSE with the Fisher information in the above proof. We first provide some basic definitions. The unconditional versions of the following definition and the upcoming results regarding the Fisher information can be found in standard detection-estimation texts; to note one, [39] is a good reference for a detailed treatment of the subject. where the expectation is over . The vector generalization of the following conditional form of the Fisher information inequality will be given in Lemma 15 in Section V-D; thus, its proof is omitted here.
Lemma 1:
Let be random variables, and let the density for any combination of them exist. Moreover, let us assume that given and are independent. Then, we have (68) for any .
Corollary 1: Let be as specified above. Then, we have Similarly, the vector generalization of the following conditional form of the Cramer-Rao inequality will be given in Lemma 13 in Section V-D, and hence, its proof is omitted here.
Lemma 2:
Let be arbitrarily correlated random variables with well-defined densities. Then, we have (71) with equality if is jointly Gaussian. We now provide the conditional form of the De Bruijn identity [24] - [26] . The vector generalization of this lemma will be provided in Lemma 16 in Section V-D, and hence, its proof is omitted here.
Lemma 3:
Let be arbitrarily correlated random variables with finite second order moments. Moreover, assume that they are independent of which is a zero-mean unit-variance Gaussian random variable. Then, we have (72) We now note the following complementary relationship between the MMSE and the Fisher information [29] , [31] : (73) which itself suggests the existence of an alternative converse which uses the Fisher information instead of the MMSE. We now provide the alternative converse based on the Fisher information. We first bound the secrecy rate of the second user as in the previous section, by following the exact steps from (36) to (41) . To bound the secrecy rate of the first user, we first rewrite (41) At this point, we compare the inequalities in (60) and (83). These two inequalities imply each other through the complementary relationship between the MMSE and the Fisher information given in (73) after appropriate change of variables and by noting that [39] . We now find the desired bound on the secrecy rate of the first user via using the inequality in (83 (90) where (87) follows from (75) and (82), and (88) is due to (83). Since (90) provides the desired bound on the secrecy rate of the first user given in (34) , this completes the converse proof.
D. Summary of the SISO Case, Outlook for the MIMO Case
In this section, we first revisited the standard converse proofs [22] , [23] of the Gaussian scalar broadcast channel, and showed that a straightforward extension of these proofs will not be able to provide a converse proof for the Gaussian SISO multi-receiver wiretap channel. Basically, a stand-alone use of the entropy-power inequality [24] - [26] falls short of resolving the ambiguity on the auxiliary random variables. We showed that, in this secrecy context, either the connection between the mutual information and the MMSE or equivalently the connection between the differential entropy and the Fisher information can be used, along with their properties, to come up with a converse.
In the next section, we will generalize this converse proof technique to the degraded MIMO channel. One way of generalizing this converse technique to the MIMO case might be to use the channel enhancement technique, which was successfully used in extending Bergmans' converse proof from the Gaussian scalar broadcast channel to the degraded vector Gaussian broadcast channel. In the degraded Gaussian MIMO broadcast channel, the nontrivial part of the converse proof was to extend Bergmans' converse to a vector case, and this was accomplished by the invention of the channel enhancement technique. However, as we have shown in Section IV-A, even in the Gaussian SISO multi-receiver wiretap channel, a Bergmans type converse does not work. Thus, we do not expect that the channel enhancement technique will be sufficient to extend our converse proof from the SISO case to the MIMO case, similar to [40] , where the channel enhancement technique alone was not sufficient for the extension of a converse proof technique from the scalar Gaussian case to the vector Gaussian case. Consequently, we will not pursue a channel enhancement approach to extend our proof from the SISO channel to the degraded MIMO channel. Instead, we will use the connections between the Fisher information and the differential entropy, as we did in Section IV-C, to come up with a converse proof for the degraded MIMO channel. We will then use the channel enhancement technique to extend our converse proof to the aligned MIMO channel from the degraded MIMO channel. Finally, we will use some limiting arguments, as in [32] , [33] , to come up with a converse proof for the most general MIMO channel.
V. DEGRADED GAUSSIAN MIMO MULTI-RECEIVER WIRETAP CHANNEL
In this section, we establish the secrecy capacity region of the degraded Gaussian MIMO multi-receiver wiretap channel, which was stated in Theorem 2. The achievability of the rates in Theorem 2 follows from Theorem 1 by selecting to be jointly Gaussian. Thus, to prove Theorem 2, we only need to provide a converse. Since the converse proof is rather long and involves technical digressions, we first present the converse proof for . In this process, we will develop all necessary tools which we will use to provide the converse proof for arbitrary in Section V-E.
The secrecy capacity region of the two-user degraded MIMO channel, from (14) , is the union of the rate pairs satisfying (91) (92) where the union is over all selections of that satisfies . We note that these rates are achievable by choosing in Theorem 1, where and are independent Gaussian random vectors with covariance matrices and , respectively. Next, we prove that the union of the rate pairs in (91) and (92) constitute the secrecy capacity region of the two-user degraded MIMO channel.
A. Proof of Theorem 2 for
To prove that (91) and (92) give the secrecy capacity region, we need the results of some intermediate optimization problems. The first one is the so-called worst additive noise lemma [41] , [42] .
Lemma 4 ([42, Lemma II.2]):
Let be a Gaussian random vector with covariance matrix , and be a positive semidefinite matrix. Consider the following optimization problem: (93) where and are independent. A Gaussian is the minimizer of this optimization problem.
The second optimization problem that will be useful in the upcoming proof is the conditional version of the following theorem.
Theorem 6:
Let be independent random vectors, where are zero-mean Gaussian random vectors with covariance matrices , respectively. Moreover, assume that the second moment of is constrained as (94) where is a positive definite matrix. Then, for any admissible , there exists a matrix such that , and
The conditional version of Theorem 6 is given as follows.
Theorem 7:
Let be arbitrarily correlated random vectors which are independent of , where are zero-mean Gaussian random vectors with covariance matrices , respectively. Moreover, assume that the second moment of is constrained as (97) where is a positive definite matrix. Then, for any admissible pair, there exists a matrix such that , and (98) (99) Theorem 6 serves as a step towards the proof of Theorem 7. Proofs of these two theorems are deferred to Sections V-C and V-D.
We are now ready to show that the secrecy capacity region of the two-user degraded MIMO channel is given by (91)-(92). We first consider , and bound it using Theorem 1 as follows: (100) (101) where the equality is obtained by using the chain rule and the Markov chain
. We now consider the expression in the first bracket of (101) (102) (103) where the second equality follows from the facts that and . We now consider the difference of differential entropies in (103). To this end, let us introduce the Gaussian random vector with covariance matrix , which is independent of . Then, we have We now consider the expression in the second bracket of (101).
For that purpose, we use Theorem 7. According to Theorem 7, for any admissible pair , there exists a such that (110) 6 Stability of Gaussian random vectors refers to the fact that the sum of two independent Gaussian random vectors is Gaussian, and the corresponding covariance matrix is the sum of the covariance matrices of the independent Gaussian random vectors.
which is equivalent to (111) Thus, using (109) and (111) in (101), we get (112) which is the desired bound on given in (92). We now obtain the desired bound on given in (91). To this end, we first bound using Theorem 1
where the second equality follows from the facts that and . To bound the difference of conditional differential entropies in (115), we use Theorem 7. Theorem 7 states that for any admissible pair , there exists a matrix such that it satisfies (110) and also (116) Thus, using (116) in (115), we get (117) which is the desired bound on given in (91), completing the converse proof for . As we have seen, the main ingredient in the above proof was Theorem 7. Therefore, to complete the converse proof for the degraded channel for , from this point on, we will focus on the proof of Theorem 7. We will give the proof of Theorem 7 in Section V-D. In preparation to that, we will give the proof of Theorem 6, which is the unconditional version of Theorem 7, in Section V-C. The proof of Theorem 6 involves the use of properties of the Fisher information, and its connection to the differential entropy, which are provided next.
B. Fisher Information Matrix
We start with the definition [39] .
Definition 2:
Let be a length-random vector with differentiable density . The Fisher information matrix of , is defined as (118) where is the score function which is given by (119)
Since we are mainly interested in the additive Gaussian channel, how the Fisher information matrix behaves under the addition of two independent random vectors is crucial. Regarding this, we have the following lemma which is due to [43] .
Lemma 5 ([43, Lemma 3]):
Let be a random vector with differentiable density, and let be its covariance matrix. Moreover, let be another random vector with differentiable density, and be independent of . Then, we have the following facts:
1) Matrix form of the Cramer-Rao inequality (120) which is satisfied with equality if is Gaussian. 2) For any square matrix (121) We will use the following consequences of this lemma.
Corollary 2: Let be as specified before. Then: 1)
2)
Proof: The first part of the corollary is obtained by choosing , and the second part is obtained by choosing (122) and also by noting that is always a symmetric matrix.
The following lemma regarding the Fisher information matrix is also useful in the proof of Theorem 6. Moreover, we need the relationship between the Fisher information matrix and the differential entropy, which is due to [34] .
Lemma 7 ([34, Theorem 4]):
Let and be independent random vectors, where is zero-mean Gaussian with covariance matrix , and has a finite second order moment. Then, we have (128)
C. Proof of Theorem 6
To prove Theorem 6, we first consider the following expression: (129) and show that (129) is bounded and finite due to the covariance constraint on . In particular, we have (130) where the lower bound can be shown by following the analysis given in (104)-(107). To show the upper bound in (130), first, we define which is Gaussian with covariance matrix , and is independent of and . Thus, without loss of generality, we can assume by noting the stability of Gaussian random vectors. Then, the right-hand side of (130) 141) where we used the fact that which is a consequence of the first part of Lemma 5 by noting that is Gaussian. We now bound the integral in (137) by using (141). For that purpose, we introduce the following lemma.
Lemma 8:
Let be positive semi-definite matrices satisfying , and be a matrix-valued function such that for . Moreover, is assumed to be the gradient of some scalar field. Then, we have (142)
Proof:
Since is the gradient of some scalar field, the integral in (142) is path-free. Thus, this integral is equivalent to (143) where denotes the Schur (Hadamard) product, and with appropriate size. Since the Schur product of two positive semi-definite matrices is positive semi-definite [44] , the integrand is non-negative implying the non-negativity of the integral.
In light of this lemma, using (141) in (137), we get (144) (145) 7 The integration in (137), i.e., J( 1 )d6, is a line integral of the vectorvalued function J( 1 ). Moreover, since J( 1 ) is the gradient of a scalar field, the integration expressed in J( 1 )d6 is path-free, i.e., it yields the same value for any path from 6 to 6 . This remark applies to all upcoming integrals of J( 1 ).
where we used the well-known fact that for . We also note that the denominator in (145) is strictly positive because (146) which implies . Following similar steps, we can also find a lower bound on . Again, using the stability of Gaussian random vectors, we have (147) where are zero-mean Gaussian random vectors with covariance matrices , respectively, , and they are independent. Using the second part of Corollary 2 in (147) yields (148) (149) where we used the fact that which follows from the first part of Lemma 5 due to the Gaussianity of . Then, (149) is equivalent to (150) and that implies 
where we again used for . Here also, the denominator is strictly positive because (154) (155) which implies . Combining the two bounds on given in (145) and (153) yields (156) Next, we will discuss the implications of (156). First, we have a digression of technical nature to provide the necessary information for such a discussion. We present the following lemma from [44] .
Lemma 9 ([44, Theorem 7.6.4]): Let
, where is the set of all square matrices of size over the complex numbers, be two Hermitian matrices and suppose that there is a real linear combination of and that is positive definite. where (189) follows from the fact that the integral in (188) is path-independent, and (191) is due to Lemma 8 and (185) .
Thus, we have shown the following: For any admissible random vector , we can find a positive semi-definite matrix such that , and
and (195) which completes the proof of Theorem 6.
D. Proof of Theorem 7
We now adapt the proof of Theorem 6 to the setting of Theorem 7 by providing the conditional versions of the tools we have used in the proof of Theorem 6. Main ingredients of the proof of Theorem 6 are: the relationship between the differential entropy and the Fisher information matrix given in Lemma 7, and the properties of the Fisher information matrix given in Lemmas 5, 6 and Corollary 2. Thus, in this section, we basically provide the extensions of Lemmas 5, 6, 7 and Corollary 2 to the conditional setting. From another point of view, the material that we present in this section can be regarded as extending some well-known results on the Fisher information matrix [39] , [43] to a conditional setting.
We start with the definition of the conditional Fisher information matrix.
Definition 3:
Let be an arbitrarily correlated lengthrandom vector pair with well-defined densities. The conditional Fisher information matrix of given is defined as (196) where the expectation is over the joint density , and the conditional score function is
The following lemma extends Stein identity [39] , [43] to a conditional setting. We provide its proof in Appendix I.
Lemma 11 (Conditional Stein Identity):
Let be as specified above. Consider a smooth scalar-valued function of , which well-behaves at infinity in the sense that (198) For such a , we have
The following implications of this lemma are important for the upcoming proofs.
Corollary 3: Let be as specified above.
1) 2)
Proof: The first and the second parts of the corollary follow from the previous lemma by selecting and , respectively.
We also need the following variation of this corollary whose proof is given in Appendix II. We are now ready to prove the conditional version of the Cramer-Rao inequality, i.e., the generalization of the first part of Lemma 5 to a conditional setting.
Lemma 13 (Conditional Cramer-Rao Inequality):
Let be arbitrarily correlated random vectors with well-defined densities. Let the conditional covariance matrix of be , then we have (202) which is satisfied with equality if is jointly Gaussian with conditional covariance matrix . Proof: We first prove the inequality in (202), and next show that jointly Gaussian with conditional covariance matrix satisfies the inequality in (202) with equality. To this end, we consider (203) (204) (205) where for the second equality, we used the definition of the conditional Fisher information matrix, and the conditional covariance matrix. We note that (205) gives (210) (211) which concludes the proof.
For the equality case, consider the conditional Gaussian distribution (212) where is the normalizing factor. The conditional score function is (213) which implies .
We now present the conditional convolution identity which is crucial to extend the second part of Lemma 5 to a conditional setting.
Lemma 14 (Conditional Convolution Identity):
Let be length-random vectors and let the density for any combination of these random vectors exist. Moreover, let and be conditionally independent given , and let be defined as . Then, we have (214) (215) The proof of this lemma is given in Appendix III. We will use this lemma to prove the conditional Fisher information matrix inequality, i.e., the generalization of the second part of Lemma 5.
Lemma 15 (Conditional Fisher Information Matrix Ineq.):
Let be as specified in the previous lemma. For any square matrix , we have (216) The proof of this lemma is given in Appendix IV. The following implications of Lemma 15 correspond to the conditional version of Corollary 2.
Corollary 4: Let be as specified in the previous lemma. Then, we have 1) 2) Proof: The first part of the corollary can be obtained by setting in the previous lemma. For the second part, the selection yields the desired result.
Using this corollary, one can prove the conditional version of Lemma 6 as well, which is omitted. So far, we have proved the conditional versions of the inequalities related to the Fisher information matrix, that were used in the proof of Theorem 6. To claim that the proof of Theorem 6 can be adapted for Theorem 7, we only need the conditional version of Lemma 7. In [34] , the following result is implicity present.
Lemma 16:
Let be an arbitrarily correlated random vector pair with finite second order moments, and be independent of the random vector which is zero-mean Gaussian with covariance matrix . Then, we have (217) Proof: Let be the cumulative distribution function of , and be the conditional density of which is guaranteed to exist because is Gaussian. We have 222) where in (219), we changed the order of integration and differentiation, which can be done due to the finiteness of the conditional differential entropy, which, in turn, is ensured by the finite second-order moments of , (220) is a consequence of Lemma 7, and (222) follows from the definition of the conditional Fisher information matrix.
Since we have derived all necessary tools, namely conditional counterparts of Lemmas 5, 6, 7 and Corollary 2, the proof Theorem 6 can be adapted to prove Theorem 7.
E. Proof of Theorem 2 for Arbitrary
We now prove Theorem 2 for arbitrary . To this end, we will mainly use the intuition gained in the proof of Theorem 6 and the tools developed in the previous section. The only new ingredient that is needed is the following lemma whose proof is given in Appendix V. We now start the proof of Theorem 2 for arbitrary . First, we rewrite the bound given in Theorem 1 for the th user's secrecy rate as follows:
where in (225), we used the Markov chain , and obtained (226) using the worst additive noise lemma given in Lemma 4. Moreover, using the Markov chain , the other difference term in (226) can be bounded as follows:
The proofs of Theorems 6 and 7 reveal that for any value of in the range given in (229), there exists positive semi-definite matrix such that (230) and (231) (232) Using (231) in (226) yields the desired bound on the th user's secrecy rate as follows: (233) We now bound the th user's secrecy rate. To this end, first note that Using the analysis carried out in the proof of Theorem 6, we can get a more refined lower bound as follows: (239) Combining (238) and (239) yields (240) Now, using the lower bound on given in (230), we get
where (242) is obtained using Lemma 6. Moreover, since we have , the following order exists:
due to Lemma 17. Equation (243) is equivalent to (244) using which in (242), we get (245) We now consider the function
with the following parameters:
where due to (245). Using this function, we can paraphrase the bound in (240) as 
We note that using (252) in (236) yields the desired bound on the th user's secrecy rate as follows:
Moreover, since and satisfies the following orderings:
Furthermore, the lower bound in (254) implies the following order:
for any Gaussian random vector such that , and is independent of , which is a consequence of Lemma 6. Using (255), and following the proof of Theorem 6, we can show that Since for any selection of the joint distribution , we can establish the bounds in (267) and (269) with positive semi-definite matrices such that , the union of these bounds over such matrices would be an outer bound for the secrecy capacity region, completing the converse proof of Theorem 2 for an arbitrary .
VI. ALIGNED GAUSSIAN MIMO MULTI-RECEIVER WIRETAP CHANNEL
We now consider the aligned Gaussian MIMO multi-receiver wiretap channel, and obtain its secrecy capacity region given in Theorem 3. First, we will show the achievability of the secrecy rates in Theorem 3 by extending Marton's achievable scheme for broadcast channels [45] to multi-receiver wiretap channels. For that purpose, we will use Theorem 1 of [46] , where the authors provided an achievable rate region for Gaussian vector broadcast channels using Marton's achievable scheme in [45] . While using this result, we will combine it with a stochastic encoding scheme for secrecy purposes.
Next, we will provide a converse proof for Theorem 3 by using our capacity result for the degraded Gaussian MIMO multi-receiver wiretap channel in Section V in conjunction with the channel enhancement technique [32] . In particular, to provide a converse proof for Theorem 3, we will show that for any point on the boundary of the secrecy capacity region, there exists a degraded channel such that its secrecy capacity region includes the secrecy capacity region of the original channel, and furthermore, the boundaries of these two regions intersect at this specific point. The channel enhancement technique comes into the picture to show the existence of such a degraded channel by explicitly constructing it, and our capacity result for the degraded case is used to obtain the secrecy capacity region of this constructed degraded channel.
A. Achievability
To show the achievability of the secrecy rates in Theorem 3, we mostly rely on the derivation of the dirty-paper coding region for the Gaussian MIMO broadcast channel in [46, Theorem 1]. We employ the achievable scheme in [46] in conjunction with a stochastic encoding scheme due to secrecy concerns. Without loss of generality, we consider the identity permutation, i.e.,
. Let be arbitrarily correlated random vectors such that (270) Using these correlated random vectors, we can construct codebooks
, where , such that each legitimate receiver can decode the following rates:
for some positive semi-definite matrices such that [46] . The messages do not carry any information, and their sole purpose is to confuse the eavesdropper. In other words, the purpose of these messages is to make the eavesdropper spend its decoding capability on them, preventing the eavesdropper to decode the confidential messages . Thus, we need to select the rates of these dummy messages as follows:
To achieve the rates given in (271), should be taken as jointly Gaussian with appropriate covariance matrices. Moreover, it is sufficient to choose as a deterministic function of , and the resulting unconditional distribution of is also Gaussian with covariance matrix [46] . To complete the proof, we need to show that the above codebook structure fulfills all of the secrecy constraints in (1) . To this end, we take a shortcut, by using the fact that, if a codebook satisfies (273) then it also satisfies all of the remaining secrecy constraints in (1) [11] . Thus, we only check (273 
B. Converse
To show the converse, we consider the maximization of the following expression: (286) where . We note that the maximum value of (286) traces the boundary of the secrecy capacity region, i.e., its maximum value for any non-negative vector will give us a point on the boundary of the secrecy capacity region. Let us define to be a one-to-one permutation on such that (287) Furthermore, let of be strictly positive, i.e., and . We now define another permutation on the strictly positive elements of such that . Then, (286) can be expressed as (288) We will show that (289) (290) where the last maximization is over all positive semi-definite matrices such that . Since the right hand side of (290) is achievable, if we can show that (290) holds for any non-negative vector , this will complete the proof of Theorem 3. To simplify the notation, without loss of generality, we assume that . This assumption is equivalent to the assumption that , and . We now investigate the maximization in (290). The objective function in (290) is generally nonconvex in the covariance matrices implying that the KKT conditions for this problem are necessary, but not sufficient. Let us construct the Lagrangian for this optimization problem (291) where the Lagrange multipliers are positive semi-definite matrices, and we defined as follows:
where . 
where we also embed the multiplications by 2 into the Lagrange multipliers. We now present a lemma which will be instrumental in constructing a degraded Gaussian MIMO multi-receiver wiretap channel, such that the secrecy capacity region of the constructed channel includes the secrecy capacity region of the original channel, and the boundary of the secrecy capacity region of this constructed channel coincides with the boundary of the secrecy capacity region of the original channel at a certain point for a given non-negative vector .
Lemma 18: Given the covariance matrices satisfying the KKT conditions given in (300)-(303), there exist noise covariance matrices such that:
for .
5)
The proof of this lemma is given in Appendix VI. Without loss of generality, we have already fixed such that , and for some . For this fixed , assume that achieves the maximum of (290). Since these covariance matrices need to satisfy the KKT conditions given in (300)-(303), Lemma 18 ensures the existence of the covariance matrices that have the properties listed in Lemma 18. Thus, we can define a degraded Gaussian MIMO multi-receiver wiretap channel that has the following noise covariance matrices: (304) where are chosen to satisfy for , where the existence of such are ensured by the positive definiteness of . The noise covariance matrix of the eavesdropper is the same as in the original channel, i.e.,
. Since this channel is degraded, its secrecy capacity region is given by Theorem 2. Moreover, since , and the noise covariance matrices in the constructed degraded channel and the original channel are the same, the secrecy capacity region of this degraded channel outer bounds that of the original channel. Next, we show that for the so-far fixed , the boundaries of these two regions intersect at this point. For this purpose, reconsider the maximization problem in (286) (305) (306) (307) where (305) is implied by the fact that for the fixed , we assumed that and , (306) follows from the facts that the constructed degraded channel includes the secrecy capacity region of the original channel, and the secrecy capacity region of the degraded channel is given by Theorem 2. The last equation, i.e., (307), comes from the fact that, since , there is no loss of optimality in choosing
. We now claim that the maximum in (307) where the equality is due to the fifth part of Lemma 18, and the inequality follows from the fact that the function (319) is monotonically increasing in the positive semi-definite matrix as can be deduced from (108), and that . Furthermore, we have the relationships given by (320)- (321) (320) (321) where the inequality in (320) follows from the concavity of in positive semi-definite matrices, and (321) follows from the third part of Lemma 18. Using (318) and (321) in (317) yields (322) which implies that the maximum in (307) is achieved by . Thus, using this fact in (307), we get
where the equality follows from the fourth part of Lemma 18.
Since the right hand side of (324) is achievable, and we can get a similar outer bound for any non-negative vector , this completes the converse proof for the aligned Gaussian MIMO channel.
VII. GENERAL GAUSSIAN MIMO MULTI-RECEIVER WIRETAP CHANNEL
In this final part of the paper, we consider the general Gaussian multi-receiver wiretap channel and obtain its secrecy capacity region given in Theorem 4. The main idea in this section is to construct an aligned channel that is indexed by a scalar variable, and then show that this aligned channel has the same secrecy capacity region as the original channel in the limit of this indexing parameter on the constructed aligned channel. This argument was previously used in [32] , [33] . The way we use this argument here is different from [32] because there are no secrecy constraints in [32] , and it is different from [33] because there are multiple legitimate receivers here.
Achievability of the region given in Theorem 4 can be shown by following the achievability proof of Theorem 3 given in Section VI-A; hence, it is omitted. For the converse, we basically use the ideas presented in [32] , [33] . Following Section V-B of [32] , we can construct an equivalent channel which has the same secrecy capacity region as the original channel defined in (20) - (21 (20)- (21) through invertible transformations [32] , both have the same secrecy capacity region. Moreover, these transformations preserve the dirty-paper coding region as well, i.e.,
We now define another channel which does not have the same secrecy capacity region or the dirty paper coding region as the original channel:
where and , and is a diagonal matrix whose first diagonal entries are 1, and the rest of the diagonal entries are zero. Similarly, , where is a diagonal matrix whose first diagonal entries are 1, and the rest are zero. We note that are invertible; hence, the channel defined by (330)-(331) can be considered as an aligned Gaussian MIMO multi-receiver wiretap channel. Thus, since it is an aligned Gaussian MIMO multi-receiver wiretap channel, its secrecy capacity region is given by Theorem 3. We now show that as , the secrecy capacity region of the channel described by (330)-(331) converges to a region that includes the secrecy capacity region of the original channel in (20) - (21) . Since the original channel in (20)- (21) and the channel in (325)-(326) have the same secrecy capacity region and the dirty-paper coding region, checking that the secrecy capacity region of the channel described by (330)-(331) converges, as , to a region that includes the secrecy capacity region of the channel described by (325)-(326), is sufficient. To this end, consider an arbitrary code which can be transmitted with vanishingly small probability of error and in perfect secrecy when it is used in the channel given in (325)-(326). We will show that the same code can also be transmitted with vanishingly small probability of error and in perfect secrecy when it is used in the channel given in (330)- (331) as . This will imply that the secrecy capacity region of the channel given in (330)-(331) converges to a region that includes the secrecy capacity region of the channel given in (325) where (362) follows from the fact that is continuous in for positive definite matrices , and (363) comes from our assumption that the codebook under consideration achieves perfect secrecy in the channel given in (325)-(326). Thus, we have shown that if a codebook achieves the perfect secrecy rates in the channel defined by (325)-(326), then it also achieves the same perfect secrecy rates in the channel defined by (330)-(331) as . Thus, the secrecy capacity region of the latter channel converges to a region that includes the secrecy capacity region of the channel in (325)-(326), and also the secrecy capacity region of the original channel in (20) - (21) . Since the channel in (330)- (331) is an aligned channel, its secrecy capacity region is given by Theorem 3, and it is equal to the dirty-paper coding region. Thus, to find the region that the secrecy capacity region of the channel in (330)-(331) converges to as , it is sufficient to consider the region which the dirty-paper coding region converges to as . For that purpose, pick the th user, and the identity encoding order, i.e., . The corresponding secrecy rate is given by (364), shown at the bottom of the page, which converges to (365) as due to the continuity of in positive semi-definite matrices. Moreover, (365) is equal to (366) which implies that the secrecy capacity region of the general Gaussian MIMO multi-receiver wiretap channel is given by the dirty-paper coding region, completing the proof.
VIII. CONCLUSION
We characterized the secrecy capacity region of the Gaussian MIMO multi-receiver wiretap channel. We showed that it is achievable with a variant of dirty-paper coding with Gaussian (364) signals. Before reaching this result, we first visited the scalar case, and showed the necessity of a new proof technique for the converse. In particular, we showed that the extensions of existing converses for the Gaussian scalar broadcast channels fall short of resolving the ambiguity regarding the auxiliary random variables. We showed that, unlike the stand-alone use of the entropy-power inequality [24] - [26] , the use of the relationships either between the MMSE and the mutual information or between the Fisher information and the differential entropy resolves this ambiguity. Extending this methodology to degraded vector channels, we found the secrecy capacity region of the degraded Gaussian MIMO multi-receiver wiretap channel. Once we obtained the secrecy capacity region of the degraded MIMO channel, we generalized it to arbitrary channels by using the channel enhancement method and some limiting arguments as in [32] and [33] . where the second equality follows from the fact that the inner expectation is zero as the first part of this lemma states. The last part of the lemma follows by selecting in the second part of this lemma.
APPENDIX III PROOF OF LEMMA 14
Throughout this proof, the subscript of will denote the random vector for which is the density. For example, is the conditional density of . We first note that (378) (379) where the second equality is due to the conditional independence of and given . Differentiating both sides of (379) 
where the inner integral can be evaluated as (427) where the interchange of the differentiation and the integration is justified by the assumption given in (223). Thus, using (427) in (426) 
Since the matrix on the right hand side of the equation is positive semi-definite due to the fact that , and we assume that , (444) implies 
